The Supreme Court Takes Affirmative Action
Toward Settling Evolving Precedent
INTRODUCTION

The equal protection element of the Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, the Due Process Clause, insures that
"[n] o person shall be ...deprived of life, liberty or property, with-

out due process of law."' Over the past several years there has been
much debate regarding federal affirmative action programs that
employ racial preferences2 and what the Fifth Amendment Due
Process Clause requires of them.' The debate centers around
whether a governmental entity, by employing policies that use preferential treatment for specified minority groups as a way of achieving a particular goal, denies nonminorities of this fundamental
constitutional right to equal protection.4
1

U.S. CONST.

amend. V.

2 Samuel L. Starks, Note, Understanding Government Affirmative Action and Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 41 DUKE LJ. 933, 935 (1991).
3 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NowAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

PROCEDURE 108-10 (Supp. 1991). The Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment is generally interpreted to hold federal governmental actions to a standard akin to that which the states are held to under the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause. RACIAL PREFERENCE AND RACIAL JUSTICE 151 (Russell Nieli
ed., 1990). The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states that
"[n]o state shall ...deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. If the federal government categorizes persons in
a manner that would breach the Equal Protection Clause if a state had taken such
action, a court will often find that the government violated the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment. 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA ET AL., TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE 315 (1986).
In Bolling v. Sharpe, where the validity of public school segregation in the District
of Columbia was at issue, Chief Justice Warren explained:
The Fifth Amendment, which is applicable in the District of Columbia,
does not contain an equal protection clause as does the Fourteenth
Amendment which applies only to the states. But the concepts of equal
protection and due process, both stemming from our American ideal of
fairness, are not mutually exclusive. The "equal protection of the laws"
is a more explicit safeguard of prohibited unfairness than "due process
of law," and, therefore, we do not imply that the two are always interchangeable phrases.
Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1953).
4 RACIAL PREFERENCE AND RACIAL JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 151. Gertrude Ezorsky
explained why affirmative action violates an individual's constitutionally protected
right to equal protection:
The burden [preferential treatment] imposes on adversely affected
whites violates their right to equal treatment. They are unfairly singled
out for sacrifice. Thomas Nagel states that "the most important arguSUBSTANCE AND
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Affirmative action, as defined in an executive order issued by
President Lyndon Johnson in 1965, originally required employers
to aggressively recruit capable minority candidates to be considered equally with all other applicants in the employer's final hiring
selection.5 Affirmative action, however, has not been confined to
the employment context, but rather has grown to include any policy that grants preferences based on membership in a specific
group.6 These policies, characterized as benign because they are
ment against preferential treatment is that it subordinates the individual's right to equal treatment to broader social aims."
GERTRUDE EzoRsKY, RACISM AND JUSTICE 82 (1991).
5 Nicholas Lemann, Taking Affirmative Action Apart, N.Y. TiMEs MAGAZINE, June 11,
1995, § 6, at 42. As Vice President to John F. Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson first attempted to achieve equal opportunity for African Americans in 1961 by playing a
major role in the enactment of Executive Order (E.O.) 10,925, often referred to as
the "Affirmative Action Order." Starks, supra note 2, at 938. This order banned discrimination of minorities by the federal government and the contractors it employed.
Id. In 1965,Johnson, as President, signed E.O. 11,246, which supplanted E.O. 10,925.
Id. Executive Order 11,246, like its predecessor, prohibited discrimination by the government and its contractors, and also required that affirmative action be taken "to
ensure that applicants are employed, and that employees are treated during employment, without regard to their race, creed, color, or national origin." Id. (quoting
Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965), reprintedin 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1993
& Supp. V)). Although E.O. 10,925 was enacted to benefit blacks, E.O. 11,246 expanded the focus of affirmative action to include Hispanics, Native Americans, and
other minorities. Terry Eastland, The Case Against Affirmative Action, 34 WM. & MARY
L. Ruv. 33, 33 (1992). In practice, E.O. 11,246 required that a business working for
the government demonstrate it used procedures that assure equal employment practices, but the order did not condone hiring and promoting solely on the basis of race.
Charlene M. Solomon, Affirmative Action: What You Need to Know, PERSONNELJOURNAL,
Aug. 1995, at 60.
6 Easfland, supra note 5, at 33 (noting in particular that affirmative action has
extended to the admissions programs of universities, professional and graduate
schools); see also Randall Kennedy, Persuasionand Distrust: A Comment on the Affirmative
Action Debate, 99 HARv. L. REv. 1327 n.1 (1986) (staring that affirmative action policies
"involve preferences based specifically on membership in a chosen group"). Affirmative action schemes vary extensively, extending from "soft forms" that may entail specialized recruitment programs, to "hard forms" that might involve retaining a specific
quantity of openings solely for members of a designated minority group. Kennedy,
supra, at 1327 n.1. Initially, the term "affirmative action" denoted programs devised
to influence employers to solicit minority job applicants. RACIAL PREFERENCE AND RACIALJUSTICE, supra note 3, at 3. Over time, however, the term grew to encompass raceconscious hiring choices and promotion practices grounded on statistical goals and
quotas. Id. Today, "affirmative action" has expanded to mean practices that regard
favorably a person's status as a female, or as part of an ethnic or racial minority.
Starks, supra note 2, at 938-39. Such practices are often employed in granting contracts, in employment and promotions, and in college admissions and scholarship
awards. Id. at 939.
Affirmative action is sometimes referred to as "reverse discrimination." Id. at 93940. This term, however, is often criticized. Id. at 940. Supporters of policies that use
racial preferences feel this phrase is inappropriate and deceptive because the goal of
such schemes is not to harm or offend the non-preferred individuals, but to assist
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not intended to adversely affect individuals,7 strive to achieve such
goals as assisting minorities in mainstreaming into society,' attempting to remedy the effects of past discrimination, 9 and promoting diversity.10
Affirmative action programs, which employ traditionallyscorned race-based classifications,1" contradict the principle of a
"colorblind" constitution.1" In Plessy v. Ferguson,3 which upheld
the "separate but equal" tenet, Justice Harlan first stated the axiom
14
that "[o]ur constitution is color blind" in the case's sole dissent.
minorities to a limited degree and in narrow circumstances in order to further racial
equality. Id. This Comment focuses only on affirmative action in the context of racial
or ethnic groups.
7 Starks, supra note 2, at 940. Benign discrimination is "the use of racial classifications to benefit rather than burden particular racial or ethnic minorities." JOHN E.
NOWAK ET AL., CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 661 (2d ed. 1983).
8 Lemann, supra note 5, at 62 (asserting that the aim of affirmative action is not to
repudiate the "spirit of integration in favor of race-consciousness but to bring blacks
into the mainstream of national life").
9 Kathleen M. Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination: Last Term's Affirmative Action Cases,
100 HARv. L. REv. 78, 82 (1986) (noting that the Supreme Court has repeatedly concentrated on redressing past discrimination as a justification for affirmative action
policies). Affirmative action programs are usually fashioned to eradicate existing discrimination, to correct the persisting consequences of prior discrimination, and to
deter discrimination in the future. Starks, supra note 2, at 939. Proponents of affirmative action programs maintain that simply discontinuing discriminatory behavior is
not adequate to attain justice for groups that have experienced discrimination because its negative effects will continue after the bigotry has ceased. RACIAL PREFERENCE AND RAcIAL JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 8.
10 See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 497 U.S. 547,
566 (1990) (condoning the FCC's use of race-based preferences to achieve its goal of
expanding diversity in broadcasting). In Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, Justice Powell maintained that diversity, in certain situations, may be suitably compelling
to uphold a policy using a racial classification. Regents of the Univ. of California v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-12 (1977).
11 Eastland, supra note 5, at 43-44. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, our country's
.greatest civil rights legislation," was based upon race-neutral beliefs. Id. at 44.
12 Starks, supra note 2, at 945; Eastland, supra note 5, at 45. The belief that the
Constitution is colorblind stems from a conviction that the Framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment contemplated it to ban discrimination of all types, notwithstanding the
goal sought to be accomplished. Starks, supra note 2, at 945, Throughout history, the
notion of a "colorblind Constitution" has been espoused. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A
Case for Race-Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1060, 1060 (1991). For example, civil
rights leader Martin Luther King,Jr. expressed the aspiration "that his children would
be judged by the 'content of their character' rather than by the 'color of their skin.'
Id. at 1061.
13 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
14 Id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan proclaimed:
Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes
among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before
the law.... The law regards man as man, and takes no account of his
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Over fifty years later, in Brown v. Board of Education,'5 the Supreme
Court declared the "separate but equal" doctrine unconstitutional
in its decision disallowing forced segregation in public schools
based on race, blessing the notion of a colorblind constitution. 6
This legal norm has come under attack in recent years because
supporters of affirmative action feel that simply discontinuing discriminatory behavior cannot reverse the perverse effects of past racial prejudice in the United States. 1 7 Justice Blackmun's assertion
that " [i] n order to get beyond racism we must first take account of
race"1 8 summarizes the position of affirmative action supporters,
who feel that the "colorblind constitution" doctrine is inadequate
to remedy the lingering impact of disparate treatment.' 9 The history of affirmative action decisions by the Supreme Court, however,
surroundings or of his color when his civil rights as guaranteed by the
supreme law of the land are involved.
Id.
Plessy involved the constitutionality of a Louisiana statute ordering that passenger
railway enterprises supply separate, but equal accommodations for its white and black
patrons. Id. at 540. The suit was brought by a United States citizen of mixed descent
who resided in Louisiana, claiming that the statute conflicted with the Thirteenth
Amendment, abrogating slavery, and the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause. Id. at 542. The Court upheld the statute, stating that such a law did not
necessarily denote inferiority of one of the races, and was within a state's police
power. Id. at 544. The majority proclaimed that the statute, which intimated only "a
legal distinction between the white and colored races" did not obliterate "the legal
equality of the two races," or reinstitute coerced servitude. Id. at 543. In its evaluation of the statute, the Court afforded great deference to the legislature. Id. at 550.
15 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
16 Harry T. Edwards & Barry L. Zaretsky, PreferentialRemediesfor Employment Discrimination, 74 MicH. L. REv. 1, 1 (citing Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
At issue in Brown was the constitutionality of laws requiring or allowing racial segregation in public schools. 347 U.S. at 487-88. The Court, in evaluating the impact of
segregation on public schooling, concluded that despite the equivalence of tangible
elements, minority youngsters were bereaved of parallel educational opportunities.
Id. at 494. But see Kennedy, supra note 6, at 1336 (interpreting Brown as standing for
the principle that the Constitution forbids situations inflicting racial domination, not
that governmental race-based classifications are unconstitutional).
17 See Edwards & Zaretsky, supranote 16, at I (arguing that some sort of affirmative
relief is necessary to redress past discrimination because simply directing an offender
to stop prejudicial action has proved inadequate to remedy the effects of prior discrimination). See also Aleinikoff, supra note 12, at 1062 (professing that society must
shift from colorblindness to color-consciousness in order to make headway in stopping racial subjugation and racism); Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is
Color-Blind", 44 STAN. L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1991) (contending that the Supreme Court's
application of colorblind constitutionalism promotes white racial domination because
it preserves "the social, economic, and political advantages that whites hold over other
Americans").
18 Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
19 Edwards & Zaretsky, supra note 16, at 1.
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reflects disagreement among the Justices as to whether 20to permit
race to be taken into account and, if so, to what extent.
20 Sullivan, supra note 9, at 81. In Fullilove v. Klutznick, Justice Stewart, with whom
Justice Rehnquist joined, reasoned why government should not act on the basis of
race:
Under our Constitution, the government may never act to the detriment of a person solely because of that person's race. 448 U.S. 448, 525
(1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting). [B]y making race a relevant criterion
.. .the government implicitly teaches the public that the apportionment of rewards and penalties can legitimately be made according to
race-rather than according to merit or ability-and that people can, and
perhaps should, view themselves and others in terms of their racial
characteristics.
Id. at 532 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens expressed a similar view in a separate dissent. See Fullilove, 448
U.S. at 532 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Justice resolved that since racial attributes
are rarely relevant in applying disparate treatment and because racial classifications
may conceivably harm society as a whole, reasons for such classifications must be
"clearly identified and unquestionably legitimate." Id. at 533-35 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In a dissenting opinion in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications
Comm'n, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and Justice Kennedy, Justice
O'Connor explicated that the Constitution prohibits racial classifications, except in
extenuating circumstances, because they deny individuals "the equal protection of the
laws." 497 U.S. 547, 603 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting U.S. CONST.
amend XLV, § 1). In Bakke, Justice Powell asserted that "[r] acial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial
examination." 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1977).
Similarly, Justice Scalia, in City of Richmond v. J A. Croson Co., shared the view of
Alexander Bickel that "discrimination on the basis of race is illegal, immoral, unconstitutional, inherently wrong, and destructive of democratic society." 488 U.S. 469,
521 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF
CONSENT 133 (1975)). Seven years later, in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, the Justice opined that "[t]o pursue the concept of racial entitlement-even for the most
admirable and benign of purposes-is to reinforce and preserve for future mischief
the way of thinking that produced race slavery, race privilege and race hatred. In the
eyes of government, we are just one race here. It is American." 115 S.Ct. 2097, 2119
(1995) (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Thomas, also concurring in Adarand, posited
that all racial categorizations should be subject to heightened scrutiny, regardless of a
benign motivation. Id. at 2119 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Some Supreme Court Justices, on the other hand, believe that the classification
of persons according to race in certain situations is constitutionally permissible. See
Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 519 (Marshall, J., concurring); Adarand, 115 S.Ct. at 2126 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall approved of racial classifications that furnish
benefits as a means of remedying past discrimination, as long as the categorizations
were substantially related to attaining that goal. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 519 (Marshall,J.,
concurring). Chief Justice Burger, in Fullilov proclaimed that in the remedial context, the Constitution did not require Congress to comport in an entirely "colorblind"
fashion. Id. at 482. TheJustice noted the Court's school desegregation decisions, like
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1970), explaining that
"[w] here federal antidiscrimination laws have been violated, an equitable remedy may
in the appropriate case include a racial or ethnic factor." Fullilove,448 U.S. at 483. See
infra note 39 (discussing Swann). In a dissenting opinion in Adarand,joined by Justice
Ginsburg, Justice Stevens insisted that the Constitution affords Congress greater deference than the states regarding the institution of affirmative action programs. 115 S.
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This Comment explores the issues surrounding affirmative action and its constitutionality. Part I examines the three levels of
review employed by the Court to scrutinize legislation challenged
as violative of the Equal Protection Clause. Part II outlines the arguments proffered by opponents and supporters of affirmative action policies. Part III reviews prominent Supreme Court decisions
involving legislation and policies that utilized race-based classifications. Finally, this Comment concludes that the Supreme Court's
decisions have progressed positively by requiring both state and
federal affirmative action programs be subject to the strictest level
of judicial review.
I.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW UTILIZED FOR

EQUAL

PROTECTION CHALLENGES

At the heart of the affirmative action debate in the Supreme
Court has been the appropriate standard of review for determining
the constitutionality of policies that utilize racial preferences.2"
The Court has adopted three different standards of review, which it
uses in evaluating the constitutionality of legislation alleged to be
discriminatory and violative of equal protection rights.2 2 In actions
challenging social and economic laws,2" the Court has implemented the "rational relationship test,"24 which entails only that
the "classification be 'rationally related' to a 'legitimate' legislative
end."25 A classification involving gender or illegitimacy is traditionally held to the more rigorous "intermediate level" of scrutiny, reCt. at 2126 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The language of the Constitution, the Justice
asserted, "represents our Nation's consensus, achieved after hard experience throughout our sorry history of race relations, that the Federal Government must be the primary defender of racial minorities against the States, some of which may be inclined
to oppress such minorities." Id.
21 Charles Fried, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Two Concepts of Equality, 104
HARv. L. REv. 107, 110 (1990).
22 MICHEL ROSENFELD, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND JuSTICE 150 (1991).
23 Id. at 150-51. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 46163 (1981) (applying the rational relationship test to a state economic statute prohibiting the sale of milk packaged in nonreturnable plastic containers, but permitting the
sale of milk in other kinds of nonreturnable cartons); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 442, 447 (1985) (applying the rational relationship test
to social legislation permitting mental hospitals only with a special use permit,
whereas boarding houses and nursing homes did not require such a permit).
24 2 RONDALD D.

ROTUNDA ET AL., supra note 3,

at 324.

25 ROSENFELD, supra note 22, at 151. In general, legislation subjected to the rational relationship test will almost always be upheld. Id. To uphold a law under this
standard of review, the government need only establish that there is a rational relationship between a legitimate objective and the legislation. 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA ET
AL., supra note 3, at 324.
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quiring that the categorization serve an "important governmental
and be "substantially related" to the fulfillment of that
objective"
6
2

goal.

Classifications that alter a fundamental right2 7 or are based on
race or ethnicity are usually subjected to "strict scrutiny," the most
difficult standard to withstand judicial examination. 8 Under
"strict scrutiny" analysis, the challenged classification must be "necessary" to advance a "compelling" governmental objective.2 9 Fur26 Starks, supra note 2, at 945. Under intermediate level scrutiny, the Court gives
very little deference to governmental conclusions and eliminates the strong presumption of legislative constitutionality. 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA ET AL., supra note 3, at 326.
Although the Court has generally not used the term "intermediate level scrutiny," in
certain instances it employs a standard that is more searching than rational basis, yet
not as exacting as strict scrutiny. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 766-67 (1977).
In Trimble, the Court resolved a dispute over a state law disallowing illegitimate children to inherit from their father's estate by applying an intermediate standard of
review. Id. at 763, 767. Justice Powell opined that "despite the conclusion that classifications based on illegitimacy fall in a 'realm of less than strictest scrutiny,' . . . the
scrutiny 'is not a toothless one."' Id. at 767 (quoting Matthews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495,
510 (1976)). See also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). Craig involved a challenge to a state statute which outlawed the sale of "3.2% beer" to males under 21 years
of age and females under 18 years of age. Id. at 191-92. The Court similarly applied
an intermediate level scrutiny in Craig,stating that "[t]o withstand constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those
objectives." Id. at 197.
27 ROTUNDA ET AL., supra note 3, at 327. Classifying a right as "fundamental" is a
substantive determination distinct from equal protection. Id. This determination entails ajudicial resolution that the wording of the Constitution indicates "the existence
of a value that should be taken from the control of the political branches of government." Id. Many fundamental rights actions include equal protection judgments because the cases entail the evaluation of legislation which categorize persons and
impose differing constraints on the capacity of those classified persons to exercise
their fundamental right. Id. at 327 n.21.
28 Starks, supra note 2, at 944. Under strict scrutiny, the Court will not acquiesce
to the determinations of other branches of government, but will independently analyze the legislation. 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA ET AL., supa note 3, at 324. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). In Shapiro, the Court confronted the issue of
whether a state requiring residence within the jurisdiction for at least one year before
persons could receive welfare benefits interfered with the fundamental "right to
travel." Id. at 621-22. Finding that the traditional standard of review did not apply to
such a situation, the Court stated that because "the classification here touches on the
fundamental right of interstate movement, its constitutionality must be judged by the
stricter standard of whether it promotes a compelling state interest." Id. at 638. See also
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). In Loving, the Court addressed the issue of
whether a state statute banning marriage between whites and nonwhites violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 2. The Court adopted
a strict scrutiny analysis stating "[a]t the very least, the Equal Protection Clause demands that racial classifications, especially suspect and criminal statutes, be subject to
the 'most rigid scrutiny.'" Id. at 11.
29 Starks, supra note 2, at 944. Under strict scrutiny, the Court will not allow every
acceptable government objective as sufficient to support a classification under this
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thermore, the legislation will be struck down unless "the means
chosen to accomplish the State's asserted purpose [is] specifically
and narrowly framed to accomplish that purpose. "30
Despite having established three levels of scrutiny for reviewing specific equal protection challenges, the Court has been inconsistent in its treatment of affirmative action policies which utilize
benign racial classifications.3 1 Initially, in City of Richmond v. J. A.
Croson,32 the Supreme Court held that the state governmental benign racial classifications implemented in affirmative action policies should be analyzed under "strict scrutiny. '3 3 One year later, in
Metro Broadcasting,Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission,3 4 the
Court ruled that such classifications, if used by the federal government, need only be reviewed under what amounted to "intermediate level" scrutiny. 33 The existence of this dual standard, however,
test. 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA ET AL., supra note 3, at 324. It will demand the government demonstrate that it is aspiring to accomplish a goal "whose value is so great that
it justifies the limitation of fundamental constitutional values." Id.
30 Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 (1986) (citing Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 480 (1979)). The phrase "narrowly tailored" has been interpreted to compel examination by the reviewing court into the availability of legal
alternatives and less constraining ways of achieving the compelling goal. Id. at 280
n.6.
31 Compare City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson, 448 U.S. 469 (1988) (applying strict
scrutiny to a state favoring minorities) with Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (implementing intermediate level scrutiny
to review a federal minority preference program).
32 448 U.S. 469 (1989). For discussion of this case, see infra notes 93-108 and
accompanying text.
33 City of Richmond, 448 U.S. at 493. Justice O'Connor explained the reasoning
behind the importance of strictly scrutinizing so-called "benign" classifications as
follows:
Absent searching judicial inquiry into the justification for such racebased measures, there is simply no way of determining what classifications are "benign" or "remedial" and what classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial
politics. Indeed, the purpose of strict scrutiny is to "smoke out" illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the legislative body is pursuing a goal
important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool. The test also
ensures that the means chosen "fit" this compelling goal so closely that
there is little or no possibility that the motive for the classification was
illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype.
Id.
34 497 U.S. 547 (1990). For a discussion of Metro Broadcasting,see infra notes 10916 and accompanying text.
35 Metro Broadcasting,497 U.S. at 564-65. The majority held:
(T] hat benign race-conscious measures mandated by Congress-even if
those not "remedial" in the sense of being designed to compensate victims of past governmental or societal discrimination-are constitutionally permissible to the extent that they serve important governmental
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was not long lived as a new Court3 6 overturned Metro Broadcasting
and brought both state and federal programs employing racial classifications under strict scrutiny. 7
II.

ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

Affirmative action is frequently debated by the American public, and it is one of the most controversial issues argued in federal
courts. 38 Proponents of affirmative action contend that policies us-

ing benign racial classifications are necessary to remedy the present effects of prior discrimination in America, such as inferior
employment opportunities.39 Proponents claim that minorities,
objectives within the power of Congress and are substantially related to
the achievement of those objectives.
Id.
36 2 ROTUNDA & NowAK, supra note 3, at 110. The Court upheld the FCC policies
by a 5-4 vote. Id. at 109. The opinion was authored by justice Brennan, with whom
justice White, justice Marshall, justice Blackmun, and justice Stevens joined. See
Metro Broadcasting v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 497 U.S. 547 (1990). Justice O'Connor, Chief Justice Rehnquist, justice Scalia, and Justice Kennedy, the four
dissenters, disputed the majority's utilization of a standard less demanding than strict
scrutiny. Id. Since Metro Broadcastingwas decided, justice Brennan, Justice Marshall,
and Justice Blackmun have left the Court. ConstitutionalLaw Conference ProbesImpact of
Supreme Court's 1994-95 Term, 64 U.S.L.W. 1125, 1140 (October 24, 1995).
37 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2113 (1995).
38 Starks, supranote 2, at 935; RACIAL PREFERENCE AND RACIALJUSTICE, supra note 3,
at 151.
39 Edwards & Zaretsky, supra note 16, at 7 (asserting that racial preferential treatment is necessary to correct past discrimination and achieve equal employment opportunities for minorities); Paul Taylor, Affirmative Action Overhaul is Urged, WASH.
POST, Aug. 4, 1995, at A6 (citing a report by the Progressive Policy Institute, a democratic think tank, suggesting that the "abysmal" state of numerous inner-city schools
and the persistence of discrepancy in standardized test marks between the races necessitate affirmative action policies on college campuses); ConstitutionalScholars' Statement on Affirmative Action After City of Richmond v.JA. Croson Co., 98 YALE L.J. 1711,
1711-12 (1989) (reaffirming the need for remedying past discrimination through use
of racial preferences in a statement signed by constitutional law scholars in response
to the Supreme Court's City of Richmond decision) [hereinafter ConstitutionalScholars
Statement].
Remedying past racial discrimination is an often-specified justification for affirmative action programs. Eastland, supra note 5, at 35. The Supreme Court has approved of its use for this purpose if the past discrimination is proved. 2 ROTUNDA &
NowAK, supra note 3, at 112 (citing Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402
U.S. 1 (1971)). The Court has specifically approved of the use of racial preference in
the education and employment contexts. Id. Swann involved the constitutionality of
a plan that used racial classifications to remedy state-administered segregation in a
North Carolina school system. Swann, 402 U.S. at 8. The Court held that in addition
to being constitutional, the school system's utilization of racial categorizations to redress the intended segregation was mandated. 2 ROTUNDA & NowAx, supra note 3, at
112 (citing Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1970)). In
Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' InternationalAssoc. v. Equal Employment Opportunity
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when forced to compete in the American education-based meritocracy, ° will be underrepresented in universities and the workplace; thus, minorities will be denied opportunities, and society will
be deprived of talent, unless affirmative action is utilized.4 1
Often, persons in favor of racial preferences cite diversity as a
goal of an affirmative action program.4 2 Proponents argue that diversity is significant in educating all Americans because it brings to
a school or workplace a wide collection of personal experiences,
perspectives, and social backgrounds. 43 Thus, supporters of policies that use racial preferences insist that diversity will benefit not
Commission, the Supreme Court upheld the district court's use of racial preferences
after finding specific instances of discrimination in the employment context. 478
U.S. 420, 485 (1986). The Court, however, has been weary of permitting such policies
if they are aimed at redressing general societal discrimination. ConstitutionalScholars'
Statement, at 1713.
40 Lemann, supra note 5, at 43. According to Lemann, an education-based meritocracy judges persons on school performance-primarily grades. Id. Society's reliance on grades and standardized test scores as a way to evaluate individual
qualifications disadvantages minorities because such criteria are heavily influenced by
the type of environment in which a person was brought up. Id. at 42-43, 52.
41 Lemann, supra note 5, at 62. Minority individuals may benefit from affirmative
action by: gaining experience, the augmentation of a professional class capable of
transferring its material gains and increased expectations to future generations, the
participation in decision making that affects minority concerns, and the elimination
of negative stereotypes. Kennedy, supra note 6, at 1329. Affirmative action may also
benefit the entire nation by producing diversity in schools and the workplace. Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1977); Solomon, supra
note 5, at 61.
42 See, e.g., Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 497 U.S.
547, 566 (1990); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 265. See generally PatriciaJ. Williams, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Regrouping in Singular Times 104 HARv.L. REv. 525, 525 (exploring diversity as a goal of affirmative action policies); Gotanda, supra note 17, at 61
(remarking that "under the goal of racial diversity, racial distinctions would be maintained, but would lose their negative connotations").
43 Judith Areen, Affirmative Action: The Benefits of Diversity, WAsH. POST, May 26,
1991, at D7. Judith Areen, Dean of the Georgetown University Law Center, illuminated that the "[d]ifferent voices in the classrooms, clinics and hallways of the law
school broaden students' perspectives and deepened their understanding of law, justice and society. When they graduate they are ready by virtue of their identities and
experiences to meet the legal needs of a complex and diverse society." Id. A
Princeton University president recounted some advantages of a diverse student body:
[A] great deal of learning occurs informally. It occurs through interactions among students of both sexes; of different races, religions, and
backgrounds; who come from cities and rural areas, from various states
and countries; who have a wide variety of interests, talents, and perspectives; and who are able, directly or indirectly, to learn from their differences and to stimulate one another to reexamine even their most
deeply held assumptions about themselves and their world. As a wise
graduate of ours observed in commenting on this aspect of the educational process, "[p]eople do not learn very much when they are surrounded only by the likes of themselves."
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only minorities, but society as a whole. 44
Defenders of affirmative action do not view the denial of opportunities to nonminorities by such programs as a harm giving
rise to a legal claim. 45 Because the preferential remedies employed
in affirmative action programs are designed to advance propitious
goals, such as fostering equality and redressing past discrimination,
proponents insist that any adverse effects are merely incidental.4 6
In sum, advocates of affirmative action maintain that such programs enable a greater number of minorities to achieve occupational and educational advancement more swiftly, and serve to
ameliorate society as a whole.
These benefits, however, do not come without a price.4' A
commonly mentioned detriment of affirmative action is that these
programs foster an "enlargement of self-doubt" because preferential treatment, often involving the lowering of standards, intimates
inferiority.4 9 Even if a recipient of a preferential policy believes
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312-13 n.48 (quoting William Bowen, Admissions and the Relevance of
Race, PRINCETON ALUMNI WEEKLY, Sept. 26, 1977, at 7, 9).
44 Areen, supra note 43, at D7. But seeJonathan Rauch, Color TV. Diversity-mongering at the FCC,THE NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 19, 1994, at 9 (asserting that a program that
discriminates for the sake of variety in reality "comes uncomfortably close to discriminating for the sake of discrimination").
45 Kennedy, supra note 6, at 1336.
46 Id. Proponents contend that the principle behind preferential remedies is
sound because such policies are contrived to promote, not suppress, equal opportunity. Edwards & Zaretsky, supra note 16, at 7. The constitutionality of affirmative
action schemes are defended on the grounds that the harm to whites caused by such
policies does not arise from racial bigotry. Kennedy, supra note 6, at 1336. Nonminorities are excluded from opportunities in favor of minorities "because of a rational
calculation about the socially most beneficial use of limited resources." Id. (quoting
RONALD DWORKIN, A MATrER OF PRINCIPLE 301-02 (1985)); see RACIAL PREFERENCE AND
RACiAL JusIcE, supra note 3, at 107 (submitting that "as Christians [there is] a responsibility to look out for other people's welfare before our own" and "affirmative action
is an appropriate way to do that").
47 Kennedy, supra note 6, at 1329.
48 Eastland, supra note 5, at 34.
49 SHELBY STEELE, THE CONTENT OF OUR CHARACTER 116-17 (1990). Shelby Steele
revealed that even though implied inferiority can be easily justified by the abundance
of hardships that spread from subjugation, it is still inferiority. Id. at 116. Steele explained that:
[i]n integrated situations where blacks must compete with whites who
may be better prepared, these explanations may quickly wear thin and
expose the individual to racial as well as personal self-doubt. All of this
is compounded by the cultural myth of black inferiority .... On largely
white campuses, blacks are five times more likely to drop out than
whites. Preferential treatment, no matter how it is justified in the light
of day, subjects blacks to a midnight of self-doubt, and so often transforms their advantage into a revolving door.
Id. at 117, 118.

1664

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:1653

that he is qualified, others may view beneficiaries of these programs as such, producing self-doubt as well.5 0 In addition, the belief that minorities are given special treatment may promote
resentment among nonminorities.51
Opponents of affirmative action insist that such programs do
not extricate those who are in the worst situation, the minorities
living in the inner-city ghettos, but instead help only those who are
in the best economic and social position.52 Opponents also argue
that preferential treatment policies serve as a type of compensation
for past oppression, which unjustly penalizes nonminorities who
played no part in past discrimination.5" Furthermore, opponents
Steven Carter, a Yale law professor and affirmative action beneficiary who voices
feelings of self-doubt in his book, cited a number of reasons given by defenders of
racial preferences as grounds for affirmative action programs, including subordinate
education, blatant racism, and cultural prejudice. STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLECTIONS
OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY 69 (1991). Carter submitted, however, that presumed
in these programs is the spurious notion "that people of color cannot at present compete on the same playing field with people who are white." Id. Representative Gary
Franks, an African American Congressman from Connecticut, professed, "I do not
want my children to feel that they are inferior to white children. I do not want someone to put their thumb on the scale in order for them to succeed." Kevin Merida,
Within GOP, Conflicts on Affirmative Action, WASH. POST, July 29, 1995, at A4. But see
Kennedy, supra note 6, at 1331 (contending that the degree to which affirmative action promotes feelings of inferiority must be weighed against the harm caused by
black underrepresentation in society).
50 Steele, supra note 49, at 117. For example, the first black law student to make
law review at the University of Virginia was given a place on the journal as a result of
an affirmative action plan conceived by the school to bring in blacks. William Raspberry, Affirmative Action that Hurts Blacks, WASH. POST, Feb. 23, 1987, at All. The
student and two of her black peers, however, were well on their way to winning spots
on their own merits. Id. The student lamented that "'affirmative action was a way to
dilute our personal victory. It took the victory out of our hands. I see this well-intentioned, liberal-white-student affirmative-action plan as an intrusion."' Id. Kennedy
maintains, however, that ultimately the indeterminate degree to which affirmative action curtails the achievements of blacks must be weighed against the stigmatization
that results from a dearth of minority representation in society's institutions. Kennedy, supra note 6, at 1331.
51 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2119 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring). Justice Thomas contended that "benign" discrimination may "provoke
resentment among those who believe that they have been wronged by the government's use of race." Id.
52 Lemann, supra note 5, at 40. See also CARTER, supra note 49, at 81 (explaining
that because a university does not want to squander its resources, it will choose those
minorities most likely to succeed; the truly disadvantaged are not likely to fall into this
category). But see Kennedy, supra note 6, at 1333 (opposing this objection because it
disregards the fact that affirmative action has opened doors for blue-collar workers,
and assumes such programs should only benefit the most deprived or victimized).
53 Easdand, supra note 5, at 35; Edwards & Zaretsky, supra note 16, at 6. Justice
Scalia, while a law professor at the University of Chicago, explained that:
[t] here are, of course, many white ethnic groups that came to this country in great numbers relatively late in its history-Italians, Jews, Irish,
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contend that there is no adequate way to repay blacks today for
the suffering of their ancestors. 4 Even if there was, opponents argue that it is impossible to ascertain methods of circumscribing the
groups and the extent to which reparations should be made. 5 5 Finally, affirmative action opponents urge that discrimination on the
basis of race, regardless of motive, is inherently wrong, violates the
United States Constitution, and is detrimental to society. 56
Poles-who not only took no part in, and derived no profit from, the
major historic suppression of the currently acknowledged minority
groups, but were, in fact, themselves the object of discrimination by the
dominant Anglo-Saxon majority ....
To be sure, in relatively recent
years some or all of these groups have been the beneficiaries of discrimination against blacks, or have themselves practiced discrimination. But
to compare their racial debt... with those who plied the slave trade,
and who maintained a formal caste system for many years thereafter, is
to confuse a mountain with a molehill.
RACAL. PREFERENCE AND RACIALJusTIcE,

supra note 3, at 216. But see Kennedy, supra

note 6, at 1336 (quoting RONALD DwoUUN, A MAYrER OF PRINCIPLE 301-02 (1985))
(asserting that whites are excluded as a result of a logical estimation of the most advantageous use of finite resources).
54 Eastland, supra note 5, at 35; Steele, supra note 49, at 119.
55 Eastland, supra note 5, at 35. Eastland argues that:
[e]ven if past wrongs and compensation for those wrongs can be inherited across decades and centuries, how can blacks living today who are
not the descendants of the victims of past racial discrimination be
"owed" the compensation of affirmative action? Similarly, how can
whites living today who are not the descendants of slave owners or segregationists be morally obligated to pay for affirmative action by losing out
on a promotion or a place in medical school? . . . Even if we could
identify all the descendants of those wronged in ages past and all the
descendants of those who committed wrongs, and then limit affirmative
action to transactions between these groups, the question would remain
whether past wrongs and the duty to compensate them can indeed be
inherited.
Id.
Many opponents are also troubled because affirmative action advances some minority individuals who cannot prove that they have been directly injured by discrimination, and encumbers some nonminorities who have not personally been guilty of
discriminating. Starks, supranote 2, at 967. See also Sullivan, supranote 9, at 92; Fried,
supra note 21, at 125; Morris B. Abram, Affirmative Action: FairShakers and Social Engineers, 99 HAxv. L. Rxv. 1312, 1321 (1986).
56 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MoRALITy OF CONSENT 133 (1975). Professor Bickel
reflected that:
[the lesson of the great decisions of the Supreme Court and the lesson
of contemporary history have been the same for at least a generation:
discrimination on the basis of race is illegal, immoral, unconstitutional,
inherently wrong, and destructive of democratic society. Now this is to
be unlearned and we are told that this is not a matter of fundamental
principle but only a matter of whose ox is gored. Those for whom racial
equality was demanded are to be more equal than others. Having
found support in the Constitution for equality, they now claim support
for inequality under the same Constitution.
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BY THE SUPREME COURT

The legal history of review by the Supreme Court of affirmative action programs reveals disagreement among the Justices as to
the proper method of evaluating these policies.3 7 The Supreme
Court has reviewed several affirmative action programs over the
past twenty years, upholding some programs and striking others.5"
The Court, however, has not handed down a clear victory or a defeat to either side.5 9 The affirmative action decisions that have
been decided on the merits of the case have often been sharply
divided, with the Justices producing a myriad of conflicting opinions.6" In short, it appears the general consensus is that affirmative
action programs should not be systematically rejected or automatically accepted.6"
One of the best-known affirmative action cases is Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke,6 2 where Bakke, a white medical
school applicant, sued the University of California Medical School
at Davis for racial discrimination when it denied him admission in
Id.
Governmental racial distinctions are presumed to be unlawful, and will only overcome this presumption by withstanding "strict scrutiny." See supra notes 27-30 and
accompanying text (examining the strict scrutiny standard of review). The average
affirmative action policy will not pass this standard and is thus unconstitutional. Kennedy, supra note 6, at 1334. In Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications
Comm'n, Justice O'Connor proffered why benign racial classifications are detrimental:
"They endorse race-based reasoning and the conception of a Nation divided into racial blocs, thus contributing to an escalation of racial hostility and conflict." 497 U.S.
547, 603 (1990). See also Eastland, supra note 5, at 34 (stating that if affirmative action
lingers in this country, it will alter for the worse the quintessence of American life).
57 See supranotes 21-37 and accomanying text (examining the standards of review
utilized by the Supreme Court in evaluating equal protection challenges).
58 See, e.g., Wygant v.Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (finding unconslitutional a school system's lay-off policy that preferred minority teachers); Regents of
the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (striking down a medical school
admissions program which favored minorities). But see Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v.
Federal Communications Comm'n, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (sustaining the FCC's use of
racial preferences to encourage minority participation); Local 28 of the Sheet Metal
Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 478 U.S. 421 (1986)
(affirming a district court's order setting a minority membership goal for a union to
redress past discrimination); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1979) (upholding a
ten percent set-aside for minority enterprises for federally funded local public works
projects).
59 Sullivan, supra note 9, at 78.
60 See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 497 U.S. 547
(1990) (sharply divided court); Wygant v.Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986)
(plurality); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1979) (disagreeing on the appropriate standard of review for benign racial classifications).
61 Sullivan, supra note 9, at 81-82.
62 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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Specifically,

Bakke claimed that the University's special admissions program,"
which evaluated "disadvantaged" applicants on a different standard
and reserved a specific number of places in the class for these persons, violated his constitutionally-protected rights.65 Writing for

the Court, Justice Powell heralded that all racial and ethnic classifications are automatically suspect and require arduous judicial scrutiny." Although the goal of attaining a diverse class is suitably
compelling in certain
instances to justify racial classifications in the
67
admissions process,

the Justice explained, in the case at bar there

63 Id. at 277-78. According to Professor Ronald Dworkin, "[n]o lawsuit has ever
been more widely watched or more thoroughly debated in the national and international press before the Court's decision." RACIAL PREFERENCE AND RACIAL JUSTIcE,
supranote 3, at 177. The allegedly less qualified student was Patrick Chavis, who graduated from the University of California Medical School at Davis and is now an obstetrician-gynecologist with a thriving practice in Los Angeles serving Medicaid patients.
Lemann, supra note 5, at 36. Chavis, who readily admits his college grades alone
would not have gotten him into UCMS at Davis, grew up on welfare and came from a
single parent home. Id. at 62.
64 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 274-75. Under the general admission policy to the medical
school, a number of factors, including undergraduate grades, MCAT scores, and extracurricular activities were considered. Id. at 273-74. The special admissions program was conducted by a separate committee, of which many participants were
minorities. Id. at 275 (citing Record 149 at 163). On the 1973 medical school application, applicants could indicate if they wanted to be deemed "'economically and/or
educationally disadvantaged;"' in 1974, they were given the option of being evaluated
as a member of a "'minority group,"' which was considered by the Medical School as
"'Blacks,' 'Chicanos,' 'Asians,' and 'American Indians.'" Id. (citing Record at 65-66,
146, 203-05, 216-18). Candidates who did choose to be evaluated under the disadvantaged classification were evaluated by the special admissions committee. Id. at 274. If
the chairman of the special admissions committee approved of the applicant's status
as "disadvantaged," the candidate was considered for admittance by the special committee's standards. Id. at 275. Although the committee had no set definition of "disadvantaged," the chairman typically examined if, for example, the candidate's
application fee had been waived, the applicant had been employed during college or
suspended his studies to support himself, or the person seeking admission was a minority group member. Id. at 274-75 n.4 (citing Record at 65-66). Candidates regarded as "disadvantaged" were evaluated similarly to the general admissions
committee's criteria, but special applicants had to meet a lower grade point average
cutoff. Id. at 275. The special admissions committee then conferred its most qualified applicants to the general admissions committee, who would reject or accept the
candidates based upon its specific requirements, although neverjudging them against
the general applicants. Id. (citing Record at 171-72). A set number of seats in the
entering class were reserved for the special applicants, and the special admissions
committee continued to present its candidates until all of the places were filled, despite the existence of qualified nondisadvantaged candidates. Id. (citing Record at
164, 166).
65 Id. at 277-78.
66 Id. at 291.
67 Id. at 314-15. Justice Powell justified the compelling nature of the diverse student population goal on First Amendment grounds since academic freedom falls
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were less onerous alternatives than completely foreclosing consideration of those not classified as "disadvantaged."68 Justice Powell
concluded that the United States Constitution allows universities to
consider race as a factor in the admissions process in promoting its
goal of ethnic diversity, as long as individual rights are protected.69
under it. Id. at 312. The Court insisted that a university be allowed to choose students whom it feels will most advance a stimulating learning atmosphere, because a
diverse student body is widely attributed to fostering the creative, experimental atmosphere crucial to the caliber of higher education. Id. (citing William Bowen, Admissions an the Relevance of Race, PRINCETON ALUMNI WEEKLY at 7, 9 (Sept. 26, 1977).
Furthermore, the majority proffered, physicians in particular should be exposed to
different ideas and cultures to prepare them to serve the diverse population they will
surely encounter in the medical profession. Id. at 314.
68 Id. at 317. The Court advocated an admissions program that regarded race and
ethnicity as a positive factor in a candidate's file provided that the applicant was compared with the general application pool for the available seats. Id. Thus, the Court
established that minority status would not be the definitive determinant in admittance. Id. at 318.
69 Bakke, 439 U.S. at 314. The Court decided that "[t]he fatal flaw in petitioner's
preferential program is its disregard of individual rights as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 320. By limiting race to a positive factor in the admissions
process, Justice Powell explained, each applicant is treated as an individual. Id. at
318. The Court suggested that with this type of program, the person "who loses out
on the last available seat to another candidate receiving a 'plus' on the basis of ethnic
background will not have been foreclosed from all consideration for that seat simply
because he was not the right color or had the wrong surname." Id.
Recently, the Fifth Circuit held that diversity was not a compelling justification
for a law school to favor some races over others in its admissions process. Hopwood v.
Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), cert denied, 116 S.Ct. 2581 (1996). In Hopwood,
four white individuals who had been rejected from the University of Texas School of
Law (law school) brought an action against the university, alleging that its admissions
process violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at
938. The law school treated African American and Mexican American applicants differently from other candidates by lowering the standards of admission for these
groups, greatly increasing their chances of admission. Id. at 936. In addition, the
preferred minority candidate's applications were assessed separately by a minority
subcommittee, and segregated waiting lists were maintained. Id. at 937-38. The purpose of this disparate treatment was to meet the law school's stated goal of admitting a
class comprised of five percent blacks and ten percent Mexican Americans. Id. at 937.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated that the Fourteenth Amendment does not allow the law school to consider race or ethnicity as a
means of achieving a diverse student population. Id. at 941. The court noted Justice
Powell's opinion in Bakke that endorsed such action, but asserted that the rest of the
Court did not share that view. Id. at 941-42. The Fifth Circuit maintained thatJustice
Powell's conviction in Bakke was not binding precedent on the diversity issue because
no otherJustices joined in that segment of the opinion. Id. at 944. The Fifth Circuit
also recognized that the Metro BroadcastingCourt permitted diversity as a permissible
goal, but discounted that view because that case was reviewed under intermediate
level scrutiny and has since been overruled. Id. The court articulated its reasoning
why the Fourteenth Amendment forbids race as a factor in promoting diversity in
higher education:
[Diversity] treats minorities as a group, rather than as individuals. It
may further remedial purposes but, just as likely, may promote im-
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The Court next had the opportunity to evaluate an affirmative
action program, which involved a congressional policy requiring a
ten-percent set-aside for minority business enterprises in federally
funded local public works projects, in Fullilove v. Klutznick.7 ° A
number of associations of building contractors and subcontractors
and a private construction firm brought suit against the Secretary
of Commerce, New York City, and New York State, on the ground
that the Minority Business Enterprise (MBE) set-aside provision
was unconstitutional on its face, alleging that it caused them financial injury.7 1 Although a majority of the Court agreed that the
MBE provision of the Public Works Employment Act was constituthe appropriate standard of
tional, no agreement was reached as to 72
classifications.
racial
benign
for
review
Joined by Justice White and Justice Powell, Chief Justice Burger, announcing the judgment of the Court, determined that the
MBE provision's objective of remedying past discrimination was
within Congress's power and its application of racial preferences
proper racial stereotypes, thus fueling racial hostility. The use of race,
in and of itself, to choose students simply achieves a student body that
looks different. Such a criterion is no more rational on its own terms
than would be choices based upon the physical size or blood type of
applicants.
Id. at 945.
70 Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 453-54 (1980). The policy at issue was established by the "Minority Business Enterprise" (MBE) provision of the Public Works
Employment Act of 1977, which ordered that a minimum of ten percent of federal
funds appropriated for local public works projects be expended by the local grantee
on services or supplies furnished by minority businesses. Id. Specifically, the MBE
provision stated:
Except to the extent that the Secretary determines otherwise, no grant
shall be made under this Act for any local public works project unless
the applicant gives satisfactory assurance to the Secretary that at least 10
per centum of the amount of each grant shall be expended for minority
business enterprises. For purposes of this paragraph, the term "minority business enterprise" means a business at least 50 per centum of
which is owned by minority group members or, in case of a publicly
owned business, at least 51 per centum of the stock of which is owned by
minority group members. For the purposes of the preceding sentence,
minority group members are citizens, of the United States who are Negroes, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts.
Id. at 454 (quoting Public Works Employment Act of 1977, Pub. L. 95-28, 91 Stat.
116, § 103(0(2)).
71 Id. at 455. The complaint claimed that the ten percent MBE requirement violated the following: the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
equal protection element of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, and a
number of antidiscrimination statutory provisions. Id.
72 Aleinikoff, supra note 12, at 1060 (citing Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448
(1979)).
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was a valid means of achieving that goal. 73 Although concurring in
the judgment, Justice Marshall, with whom Justice Brennan and
Justice Blackmun joined, believed that the test for ascertaining the
constitutionality of benign racial classifications that are intended to
remedy prior racial discrimination should be whether the classification facilitates important governmental goals and is substantially
related to fulfillment of those goals. 74 Justice Powell, in a concurring opinion, provided yet another standard to be applied to racial
classifications like the one in the MBE provision.75 Justice Powell
maintained that such a classification should only be upheld if it is
required to promote a compelling governmental interest. 76 In
sum, the Fullilove Court endorsed affirmative action to remedy the
the
past iniquities of discrimination, but the Justices disagreed on 77
programs.
challenged
to
apply
to
scrutiny
of
level
appropriate
In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,7 the Court confronted

a Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection 79 challenge to a state
73 Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 478. The Chief Justice deduced that Congress obtained its
authority to remedy past racial discrimination from the spending power granted to it
under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. Section five of the Fourteenth
Amendment reads "[t ] he Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONsr. amend. XIV, § 5. The Court opined
that because contracts are granted only to qualified MBEs, the fact that they may not
be the lowest bid merely reflects costs escalated by the current effects of past discrimination. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 481. Furthermore, the Chief Justice rationalized that
should a grantee be unable to fulfill the provision, an administrative waiver is available on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 481-82.
74 Id. at 519 (Marshall,J., concurring). The standardJustice Marshall employed in
Fullilove is the same as articulated in justice Brennan's opinion in Bakke. Id. (citing
Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 359 (1978)) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)). In Bakke, Justice Brennan opined that the
correct query is whether racial classifications contrived to advance remedial objectives
facilitate important governmental goals and are substantially related to the accomplishment of those goals. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 359. Justice Marshall explained that
"[b] ecause the consideration of race is relevant to remedying the continuing effects
of past racial discrimination, and because governmental programs employing racial
classifications for remedial purposes can be crafted to avoid stigmatization," the traditional "strict scrutiny" review applied to racial classifications is not necessary. Fullilov
448 U.S. at 519 (Marshall, J., concurring).
75 Id. at 496 (Powell, J., concurring).
76 Id. Justice Powell applied the evaluation articulated in his opinion in Bakke
insisting that adherence to the "strict scrutiny" standard was critical in evaluating racial classifications because "immutable characteristics, which bear no relation to individual merit or need, are irrelevant to almost every governmental decision." Id. In
Fulilove, however, Justice Powell found the policy justifiable because it served the
compelling governmental pursuit of eliminating the enduring effects of prior discrimination recognized by Congress. Id.
77 Sullivan, supra note 9, at 83.
78 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
79 See supra note 3 (discussing the difference between the equal protection ele-
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affirmative action program, which required a school board to give
preferential protection to some of its minority employees facing
layoffs."0 Displaced nonminority teachers brought an action
against the Jackson Board of Education, alleging that they lost their
jobs because of their race, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause."' Both the district court and the
court of appeals agreed with the school board that its interest in
maintaining minority role models for its minority pupils was adequate to justify the layoff provision's racial classification and upheld the policy. 2 The school board also argued that the layoff
provision was a means
of remedying prior racial discrimination by
83
the school board.
Justice Powell, writing for the plurality, determined that the
layoff provision violated the Equal Protection Clause. 4 When evaluating racial preferences, the Justice resolved, strict scrutiny must
ment of the Fifth Amendment and Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
80 Wygant, 476 U.S. at 269-70. As a result of racial strain in the community that
reached the schools, the Jackson Board of Education, with the Jackson Education
Association, appended the following provision to the Collective Bargaining Agreement between them:
In the event that it becomes necessary to reduce the number of teachers
through layoff from employment by the Board, teachers with the most
seniority in the district shall be retained, except that at no time will
there be a greater percentage of minority personnel laid off than the
current percentage of minority personnel employed at the time of the
layoff. In no event will the number given notice of possible layoff be
greater than the number of positions to be eliminated. Each teacher so
affected will be called back in reverse order for positions for which he is
certificated maintaining the above minority balance.
Id. at 270-71 (quoting Collective Bargaining Agreement, Art. XII, App. 13). The Collective Bargaining Agreement, Article VII delineated "minority group personnel" as
"employees who are Black, American Indian, Oriental, or of Spanish descendancy."
Id. at 271 n.2 (quoting Collective Bargaining Agreement, Art. XII, App. 15).
81 Id. at 272-73. The displaced nonminority educators also claimed the race-based
layoff policy violated Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and various state and federal statutes,
although the main issue of the case was the equal protection challenge. Id.
82 Id. at 274 (citing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 746 F.2d 1152, 1156-57 (6th
Cir. 1984)).
83 Id. at 277. The School Board asserted that its objective in adopting the layoff
policy was to redress alleged past discrimination against minorities in hiring by the
Jackson School District. Id. The two prior courts that reviewed this issue, however,
found that any discrepancies in hiring statistics resulted from universal societal discrimination, not from past discrimination by the Board. Id. at 278. In the present
case, the Board contended that given another chance, it could prove previous discrimination. Id. The Wygant Court decided that it need not even ponder the issue
because it resolved that "the layoff provision was not a legally appropriate means of
achieving even a compelling purpose." Id.
84 Id. at 284.
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be applied, which means that the classifications must be supported
by a compelling state objective, and the method selected must be
narrowly tailored. 5 The Court demonstrated that the "rolemodel" theory failed as a justification for the racial classification
because it was far too broad and bore no relation to the injury
caused by past discriminatory employment practices.86 Furthermore, the Justice insisted that no finding was made that corrective
action was needed to remedy previous discrimination.8 7 Finally,
Justice Powell advanced that other, less burdensome ways of achieving legitimate objectives were available, such as hiring goals.88
Shortly after Wygant, the Court reviewed a case involving
union membership goals in Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' InternationalAssociation v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.8 9 In

Sheet Metal Workers, after the union had ignored the district court's
previous orders to discontinue discriminatory admission procedures, the court set a minority membership goal for the union to
redress the contempt of its prior orders. 90 Although no single
85 Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274.
86 Id. at 276. The Court acknowledged that there has been significant societal
discrimination in the United States, but insisted that is no justification for inflicting
discriminatory legal relief that harms innocent people. Id. To permit the limited use
of benign racial classifications, the Justice maintained, there must be persuasive proof
of past discrimination by the governmental body concerned. Id. at 274.
87 Id. at 277-78.
88 Id. at 283-84. Justice Powell distinguished between hiring goals and racially
based layoff policies by explaining that:
Though hiring goals may burden some innocent individuals, they simply do not impose the same kind of injury that layoffs impose. Denial of
a future employment opportunity is not as intrusive as loss of an existing
job.... Even a temporary layoff may have adverse financial as well as
psychological effects.... Layoffs disrupt these settled expectations in a
way that general hiring goals do not.
Id. at 282-83.
89 478 U.S. 421 (1986).
90 Id. at 426. In 1964, the New York State Supreme Court affirmed an order by the
New York State Commission for Human Rights (Commission) demanding that the
union "cease and desist" its discriminatory customs, and also required it to abide by a
membership goal plan the court had devised. Id. at 427. In 1975, the district court
found the union guilty of violating Tide VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e, for engaging in discriminatory practices against African American and Hispanic persons. Id. at 426. The Commission found, for example, that the union had
never had a member or apprentice that was black. Id. at 427. Furthermore, obtaining
an apprenticeship was basically "'on a nepot[is]tic basis involving sponsorship by incumbent union members,'" making it practically impossible for minority applicants to
secure a position. Id. at 427 (quoting App. JA-407). The court established that certain criteria used to choose apprentices were not correlated to job performance and
had an negative impact on minorities, such as the entrance exam and the high-school
graduate requirement. Id. at 429-30. The court also found that the union had limited
its membership as a way to decline admittance to minorities. Id. at 430. Moreover,
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opinion attracted a majority of the Court, the membership goal
was upheld.91 Justice Powell, writing separately, recognized that
the union's discriminatory practices qualified as a compelling gov92
ernmental interest sufficient to withstand judicial scrutiny.
In City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co.,93 the Court was faced
with a state set-aside program similar to the federal policy upheld
in Fullilove.9 4 At issue in Croson was the constitutionality of a policy
ordering that a minimum of thirty percent of the monetary
amount of contracts granted by the city to prime contractors be
MBEs.9 5 This program was adopted to alleviate the consequences
of prior discrimination by encouraging greater participation of
MBEs in public construction jobs.9 6 The lower courts upheld the
set-aside policy, implementing the test conceived in the principle
opinion in Fullilove which gave great deference to Congress's determinations of previous discrimination.97 The Supreme Court, howthe court discovered that the union also had established nonunion sheet metal shops
with practically no minority workers, and pooled its members from the nonminority
workers of those shops. Id. at 431. Finally, the lower court uncovered that white applicants who wanted to transfer were given preference over minorities. Id. In both
1982 and 1983, the district court found the union guilty of civil contempt because it
had defied the 1972 orders. Id. at 434-36.
91 Id. at 440.
92 Id. at 485 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell reiterated that a constitutional
challenge to a racial classification "'must necessarily receive a most searching examination to make sure that it does not conflict with constitutional guarantees.'" Id. at
484 (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting Fullilov, 448 U.S. at 491). Justice Powell found
the lower court's conclusion that the union's practices were deplorable violations of
Title VII sufficiently compelling to justify the application of a remedy that employed
racial classifications. Id. at 484. Furthermore, the Justice believed the lower court's
remedy was narrowly tailored to the goal of eliminating discrimination by the union
because the membership goal imposed was not a permanent standard, it was correlated to the percentage of minorities in the pertinent work force, it imposed only a
slight burden on nonminorities, and there were no other effective alternatives available. Id. at 485-88 (Powell, J., concurring).
93 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
94 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
95 Croson, 488 U.S. at 477-78. According to the plan's definition, an MBE is a business where fifty-one percent of the company is owned and controlled by "'Black[ ],
Spanish-speaking, Oriental[ ], Indian[ ], Eskimo[ ], or Aleut[ ]" citizens, which may
come from anywhere in the United States. Id. at 478. In exceptional situations, a
waiver of the thirty percent requirement could be granted by the city if it was proved
that every viable effort had been made to obey the policy and that qualified MBEs
were not able or willing to join in the contract in order to meet the specified goal. Id.
at 478-79.
96 Id. at 478.
97 Id. at 483-84. The Court pointed out that the Croson I court found "reasonable"
the city's deduction that low minority participation in city contracts was due to past
discrimination, in light of national determinations of bias in the construction business
and the statistical analysis regarding the assigning of prime contracts in Richmond.
Id. (citing J. A. Croson Co. v. City of Richmond, 779 F.2d 181, 190, n.12 (4th Cir.
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ever, vacated and remanded this case for additional consideration
consistent with its interceding opinion in Wygant, holding that a
program employing a racial preference required the application of
a strict scrutiny standard.9 8
On remand, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit applied the strict scrutiny standard and held that the City of Richmond's plan violated both parts of that test.99 First, the court
found no compelling governmental interest because past discrimination by the city itself was not established."' 0 Second, the court
explained that even if a compelling interest had been established,
the means chosen to attain a remedial goal was not narrowly
tailored. 10 1
The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decision,
distinguishing this case, which involved state action, from FuUilove,
where a federal policy was at issue. 10 2 Justice O'Connor, writing for
the majority, interpreted section five of the Fourteenth Amendment as empowering Congress to enforce the amendment by identifying and remedying violations, such as prior discrimination. 0 3
1985) [Croson 1]). Then, the majority noted, the Croson Icourt found the thirty percent set-aside number to be "narrowly tailored to the legislative goals of the Plan." Id.
(quoting Croson I, 779 F.2d at 190). The Justice explained that the figure arrived at by
the city, thirty percent, was compared to the entire minority population in the City of
Richmond, fifty percent, as opposed to the quantity of minority business enterprises
in the city, 0.67 percent; thus, the court deemed the figure "reasonable." Id. at 48485.
98 Id. at 485. See supra notes 78-88 and accompanying text (discussing Wygant v.
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986)).
99 Id.
100 Croson, 488 U.S. at 485. The court of appeals held that societal discrimination
was not a sufficiently compelling reason; the evidence must prove past discrimination
by the governmental body enacting the legislation including a race-based policy. Id.
(quotingJ. A. Croson v. Richmond, 822 F.2d 1355, 1358 (4th Cir. 1987)).
101 Id. at 486. The appellate court found that there was no connection between the
quantity of minority subcontractors in Richmond and the thirty percent set-aside figure chosen by the city. Id.
102 Id. at 486, 490.
103 Id. Justice O'Connor explained:
That Congress may identify and redress the effects of society-wide discrimination does not mean that, a fortiori, the States and their political
subdivisions are free to decide that such remedies are appropriate. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment is an explicit constraint on state
power, and the States must undertake any remedial efforts in accordance with that provision... . The mere recitation of a benign or compensatory purpose for the use of a racial classification would essentially
entitle the States to exercise the full power of Congress under § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment and insulate any racial classification from judicial scrutiny under § 1. We believe that such a result would be contrary
to the intentions of the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, who
desired to place clear limits on the States' use of race as a criterion for

1996]

AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

1675

The Court maintained "that the standard of review under the
Equal Protection Clause is not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefited by a particular classification."" 4 Therefore,
Justice O'Connor concluded that a heightened level of scrutiny
must be applied.' 0 5
The majority explained that the purpose of the City of Richmond's program-to remedy differing types of prior societal discrimination-was too generalized and speculative to withstand the
constitutional challenge.1 0 6 The Justice compared the set-aside
program in Croson with the layoff policy struck down in Wygant,
asserting that both programs involved vague pronouncements of
previous discrimination in an entire industry, which gave a legislature no direction in ascertaining the specific scope of the harm it
sought to remedy. 10 7 The Court explained that because the enumerated minorities from anywhere in the country were automatically entitled to unequivocal partiality over other citizens based
only on their race, Richmond's plan was not narrowly10 8tailored to
redress the impact of past discrimination in this case.
Against this backdrop, the Court decided Metro Broadcasting,
Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission,10 9 which involved the
constitutionality of minority preference programs utilized by the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to promote participation by minorities in the broadcast industry. 10 The two policies at
legislative action, and to have the federal courts enforce those
limitations.
Id. at 490-91.
104 Id. at 494.
105 Croson, 488 U.S. at 495.
106 Id. at 498-99. The Court noted a number of nonracial factors cited by the city
that persons of any minority group attempting to initiate a new business venture
could face, like inadequate working capital, trouble meeting bonding requirements,
unfamiliarity with bidding processes, and impairment by an insufficient track record.
Id.
107 Id. at 498.
108 Id. at 508. The Court explained that "[u]nder Richmond's scheme, a successful
black, Hispanic, or Oriental entrepreneur from anywhere in the country enjoys an
absolute preference over other citizens based solely on their race. We think it obvious
that such a program is not narrowly tailored to remedy the effects of prior discrimination." Id.
109 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
110 Id. at 552-53. The programs in controversy were adopted by the FCC in an effort to satisfy its duty pursuant to the Communications Act of 1934, which sought to
promote diversification of programming. Id. at 554-55. The FCC felt that its previous
attempts to foster minority participation in the broadcast business had been inadequate. Id. at 556. The state of broadcasting at that time, the FCC believed, was damaging to the minority audience, as well as to the entire viewing and listening
populace. Id.
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stake were: 1) a program that granted an enhancement in comparative actions for new licenses to stations controlled by minorities,1 '
and 2) a "distress sale" plan that permitted a radio or television
station whose license qualifications had become questionable to
transfer its license to a minority enterprise in lieu of going through
the usual noncomparative hearing. 112 In a decision that has been
highly criticized, the Supreme Court held that these programs
were constitutional because they were "substantially related" to the
achievement of "the important governmental objective of broadcast diversity.""'
Justice Brennan, writing for the sharply divided Court, stressed
that the judiciary owes deference to Congress's judgment that minority ownership programs further its diverse programming goal;
thus, strict scrutiny was unnecessary." 4 The Justice indicated that
broadcast diversity is an important governmental goal because it
111 Id. at 556. Under this policy, the FCC considers ownership or active management by a minority as a "plus" factor, to be balanced with the other germane factors.
Id. at 557 (citing WPIX, Inc., 68 F.C.C.2d 381, 411-12 (1978)). Other elements the
FCC considered when comparing applications for new radio or television licenses
were "diversification of control of mass media communications, full-time participation
in station operation by owners (commonly referred to as the "integration" of ownership and management), proposed program service, past broadcast record, efficient
use of the frequency, and the character of the applications." Id. (quoting Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d 393, 394-399 (1965)).
112 Id. at 557. The "distress plan" afforded minority entrepreneurs the chance to
acquire reassigned and transferred licenses. Id. (citing WPIX, Inc., 68 F.C.C.2d at
983). Typically, when a licensee's qualifications to hold a broadcast license becomes
questionable, it may not allocate that license until the FCC has settled its qualms in a
noncomparative hearing. Id. Under the distress sale plan, however, such a broadcaster may assign the license to a minority enterprise sanctioned by the FCC. Id. (citing Commission Policy Regarding the Advancement of Minority Ownership in
Broadcasting, 92 F.C.C.2d 849, 851 (1982)).
113 Id. at 566. Professor Charles Fried of Harvard Law School voiced that:
[r]egardless of the validity of Fulilove's reading of section 5, neither of
these special powers of Congress could justify the outcome in Metro
Broadcasting. The additional deference to which Congress is entitled
when acting under its section 5 power amounts to a greater presumption that it has found the facts necessary to prove a constitutional violation and that it has the power to undertake the preferred remedy;
deference to Congressional fact-finding and remediation in no way alters the substantive standards that determine what does or does not violate the Constitution.
Charles Fried, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Two Concepts of Equality, 104 HARv. L.
REv. 107, 114 (1990). See also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097,
2112 (1995) (admonishing the outcome in Metro Broadcasting).
114 Metro Broadcasting,497 U.S. at 564. The majority relied on Chief Justice Burger's view in Fullilove, which called for deference to Congress in view of its "constitutional competence as the National Legislature," in addition to the authority pursuant
to the Commerce and Spending Clauses, and the Civil War Amendments. Id. at 563.
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promotes great dispersal of information from various sources
which furthers vital First Amendment values and benefits the
American public as a whole." 5 The Court, accepting Congress's
and the FCC's empirical data suggesting that minority owners and
managers impact the choice of material broadcasted and the manner in which minorities are presented to the public, found a substantial link between greater minority ownership and broadcast
1 16
diversity.
At the time the Supreme Court decided Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena,"7 the history of the Court's affirmative action decisions revealed a dual system of analysis: evaluating state policies
under strict scrutiny, and examining federal schemes, at times, pursuant to a less demanding standard. 1 8 Recently, in Adarand, the
United States Supreme Court undertook to clarify the standard required for judicial review of federal affirmative action programs. 19
Adarand involved an equal protection challenge, by a nonminority
subcontractor who was not awarded a federal highway contract, to
a federal program which afforded incentives for contractors to hire
1 20
minorities.
The program giving rise to the dispute in Adarand was based
on the Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance
Act (STURAA), enacted by Congress in 1987.121 The STURAA required, inter alia, that at least ten percent of the Department of
Transportation's appropriated funds be expended on small businesses owned by "socially and economically disadvantaged persons."122 Under the STURAA, persons are presumed to be socially
115 Id. at 568.

116 Id. at 569. The Court relied on the FCC's observations that "'ownership of
broadcast facilities by minorities is [a] significant way of fostering the inclusion of
minority views in the area of programming,' and '[f] ull minority participation in the
ownership and management of broadcast facilities results in a more diverse selection
of programming."' Id. (quoting WPIX, Inc., 68 F.C.C.2d 979, 981 (1978)). In addition, the majority stated that the FCC's minority ownership programs are in line with
Congress's established goals under the Communications Act, which was enacted with

the assumption that diversification of ownership will extend the realm of programming accessible to the public. Id. at 570.
117 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
118 See supra notes 21-37 and accomanying text (explaining the standards of review
utilized in by courts when evaluating statutes challenged on equal protection
grounds).
119 Id.
120 Id. at 2102.
121 Id. at 2103.
122 Id. (citing Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of

1987, Pub. L. No. 100-17, 101 Stat. 132, 145, § 106(c) (1)). The STURAA included the
definition by the Small Business Act (SBA) of "socially and economically disadvan-
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and economically disadvantaged if they are a member of an enu1 3
merated racial minority or female.
This presumption, however,
4
12
is rebuttable by a third party.

Pursuant to this act, Mountain Gravel and Construction Company was awarded a Colorado highway construction contract by the
Central Federal Lands Highway Division (CFLHD) of the United
States Department of Transportation (DOT) which provided compensation for hiring a disadvantaged small business. 2 5 According
to this contract, Mountain Gravel would obtain additional payment
for hiring small business subcontractors predominantly owned by
"socially and economically disadvantaged individuals."12 6 Although

Adarand, a construction company based in Colorado, submitted
the low bid, Mountain Gravel awarded the subcontract to Gonzales
Construction Company because of the extra compensation it
would receive from the government for employing Gonzales, a
company controlled by a "socially and economically disadvantaged
individual." 12 7 Subsequent to losing the Mountain Gravel contract
to a "disadvantaged" business, Adarand brought an action against
several federal officials alleging that the subcontracting compensation clauses containing race-based presumptions violated
its right
12 8
to equal protection under the Federal Constitution.
The United States District Court for the District of Colorado
taged individual." Id. (quoting Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation
Assistance Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-17, 101 Stat. 146, § 106(c)(2)(B)). The SBA
defines such "socially disadvantaged" persons as "those who have been subjected to
racial or ethnic prejudice or cultural bias because of their identity as a member of a
group without regard to their individual qualities." Id. at 2102 (quoting Small Business Act, 72 Stat. 384, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §631, § 8(a) (5), 15 U.S.C. § 637(a) (5)).
"Economically disadvantaged individuals," according to the SBA, are "those socially
disadvantaged individuals whose ability to compete in the free enterprise system has
been impaired due to diminished capital and credit opportunities as compared to
others in the same business area who are not socially disadvantaged." Id. (quoting
Small Business Act, 72 Stat. 384, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §631, § 8(a) (6) (A), 15 U.S.C.
§ 637(a) (6) (A)).
123 Adarand, 115 S.Ct. at 2103. Under section 8(a) of the SBA, persons who are
Black Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, Asian Pacific Americans,
and other minorities are presumed to be socially disadvantaged. Id. (citing
§ 124.105(b)(1)). Also in accordance with section 8(a) of the SBA, a person not a
member of a minority group may be found to be similarly impaired. Id. at 2102 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 637(d) (2)).
124 Id. at 2103 (citing 49 C.F.R. § 23.69 (1994)).
125 Id. at 2102.
126 Id. at 2103.
127 Id. at 2102. Mountain Gravel's Chief Estimator presented an affidavit reporting
that Mountain Gravel accepted Gonzales's bid, and not Adarand's, only because of
the extra compensation it received by employing Gonzales. Id.
128 Adarand, 115 S.Ct. at 2104.
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awarded a motion for summary judgment to the government.1 29
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, applying its interpretation of Supreme Court decisions articulating the appropriate
standard of review for evaluating the constitutionality of federal
race-based programs.13 0 The appeals court interpreted the Court's
opinions as adopting "a lenient standard, resembling intermediate
scrutiny" and upheld the utilization of subcontractor compensation clauses.131
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to clarify
the proper standard required in reviewing cases involving racial
classifications in federal governmental programs.1 3 2 In a 5-4 decision that overruled Supreme Court precedent, the Court held that
regardless of whether a racial classification is imposed by federal,
state, or local government action, the program must be analyzed by
a court under strict scrutiny. 133 Through its decision in Adarand,
and elucidated
the Court chronicled affirmative action decisions
134
policies.
federal
for
review
of
the standard
Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, first considered
whether Adarand had standing to pursue declaratory and injunctive relief against enforcement of prospective subcontractor compensation clauses.13 5 The Court concluded that Adarand met the
standing requirements for forward-looking relief dictated by its
prior cases."3 6 The Justice based this determination on the finding
that Adarand would bid again sometime in the foreseeable future
to a
on a government contract that provides monetary incentives
7
contractor who hires disadvantaged subcontractors. 1
129 Id. (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Skinner, 790 F. Supp. 240 (1992)).
130 Id. (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Skinner, 16 F.3d 1537 (10th Cir.

1994)).
131 Id. at 2104 (citing Adarand, 16 F.3d at 1544).
132 Id.
133 Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113.
134 Id. at 2108-13.
135 Id. at 2104.
136 Id. at 2105. The majority relied on Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, which declared
that to maintain a claim for future relief, the party must prove that the alleged injury
is " ' an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized,

and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical."' Id. at 2104 (quoting
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). The Adarand Court found
Adarand's assertion that it was denied equal protection of the law by the Federal
Government's subcontractor compensation clauses was a legally protected concern
which was material and specific to it. Id. at 2104-05. As to the second prong of the
Lujan test, the majority was convinced that Adarand would likely bid annually on contracts with a subcontractor compensation clause and it would be forced to contend
with small disadvantaged businesses for such contracts. Id. at 2105.
137 Id.
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Next, the majority tackled the predominant issue of the case,
determining what level of scrutiny should be applied in reviewing
the Subcontracting Compensation Clause program implemented
by the federal government.1 8 The Justice explained that although
race-neutral federal regulations based on disadvantage requires
"the most relaxed judicial scrutiny," a government program that
incorporates a race-based rebuttable presumption must be more
carefully scrutinized.13 9 The Court first looked to the language of
the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution,
noting that the Supreme Court has historically varied the importance given to the wording of the two amendments." 4 The Justice
observed that although the Fifth Amendment partially shields individuals from capricious strategies utilized by the federal government, it does not clearly pledge equal treatment as the Fourteenth
141
Amendment does.
Justice O'Connor then surveyed cases that had inquired into
the meaning of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments in the context of equal protection guarantees by the federal government and
the states.' 4 2 The majority concluded that despite the sporadic
138

Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2105.

139 Id. at 2105 (citing Respondent's Brief at 27, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,

115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995)).
140 Id. at 2105-06.
141 Id. at 2106.
142 Id. at 2106-08. The majority noted that in the 1940's the Supreme Court consistently held that in non-race-related circumstances, the Fifth Amendment gives no support against federal discriminatory legislation. Id. at 2106. TheJustice explained that
when confronted with an equal protection challenge questioning the constitutionality
of a federal racial classification on Fifth Amendment grounds, the Supreme Court
approached the matter correspondingly, finding that the Fifth Amendment allowed
discriminatory legislation by Congress unless it caused a person to be denied due
process. Id. (citing Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 102 (1943) (upholding
a curfew imposed upon persons of Japanese descent, requiring only rational basis
review of decisions by those responsible for national defense)). Justice O'Connor
revealed that in Korematusu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), the Supreme
Court acknowledged that all legal restraints on civil rights of a particular race are
instantly suspect and subject to strict scrutiny review. Id. (citing Korematsu, 323 U.S. at
217) (holding that an order entirely excluding persons of Japanese ancestry from
certain areas was within the federal government's jurisdiction). However, the Justice
lamented that despite the heightened level of scrutiny the Supreme Court articulated,
the Korematsu Court upheld the federal government's racially discriminatory order at
issue in the case. Id. It was not until Boiling v. Sharpe, the majority explained, that the
Court specifically considered whether there was any difference between the duties of
the federal government and the states regarding racial classifications. Id. at 2107. See
supra note 3 (discussing Bolling v. Sharpe). The majority interpreted Boiling as imposing parallel duties on the federal government and the states. Id. The Justice then
listed several subsequent Supreme Court cases which endorsed the holding in Bolling.
Id. at 2107-08.
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cases that have allowed deference to the federal government, the
general rule is that the federal government and the states should
be held to the same standards regarding equal protection
1 43

obligations.

Justice O'Connor next discussed several cases that questioned
whether governmental benign racial classifications need to be subjected to a heightened level of scrutiny as well.1 44 First, the Court
discussed Regents of the University of Californiav. Bakke,14 where the
Supreme Court repudiated the petitioner's argument that strict
scrutiny need only apply to racial categorizations that "disadvantage discrete and insular minorities."14 6 The Justice then reviewed
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 47 upholding a ten-percent set-aside for "businesses owned by minorities" mandated by Congress, and Wygant v.
Jackson Board of Education,148 disallowing a school board's employment of race-based preferences to decide which teachers to lay
off.1 4 9 The Court observed that none of these cases produced a
majority opinion. 50 This inability to furnish a majority opinion,
Justice O'Connor proclaimed, has left the appropriate analysis for
1 51
curative race-based governmental action unsettled.
Justice O'Connor next looked to City ofRichmond v. J A. Croson
Co., 152 which involved a city's policy of granting the thirty percent
143 Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2107-08. The Court therefore reasoned that its approach
to claims under the Fifth Amendment should be the same as those under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
144 Id. at 2108-09.
145 438 U.S. 287-88 (1978).
146 Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2108 (citing Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 287-88 (1977)). The majority cited a passage from Justice Powell's opinion,
joined by Justice White, proclaiming that the equal protection guarantee does not
mean different things when applied to different people. Id. The Court recognized
that four Justices believed that a less rigorous standard was required to review racial
classifications conceived to further corrective goals. Id. See supra notes 62-69 and accompanying text (discussing Bakke).
147 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
148 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
149 Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2108-09. See supra notes 70-77 and accompanying text
(discussing the Fullilove decision); supranotes 78-88 and accompanying text (examining the Wygant case).
150 Id. at 2109.
151 Id. The Court noted that lower courts found this lack of direction disturbing.
Id. at 2110 (quoting Kromnick v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 739 F.2d 894, 901 (3rd
Cir. 1984) cer. denied, 469 U.S. 1107 (1985)) ("'The absence of an Opinion of the
Court in either Bakke or Fullilove and the concomitant failure of the Court to articulate an analytic framework supporting the judgments makes the position of the lower
federal courts considering the constitutionality of affirmative action programs somewhat vulnerable.'").
152 448 U.S. 469 (1989).
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of its contracts to minority-owned businesses.1 5 The majority observed that the Croson Court found the appropriate standard of review under the Equal Protection Clause for state action to be strict
scrutiny, regardless of which race is encumbered or advanced."'
The Justice noted, however, that in Crosonno decision was made as
to the standard of review to be applied under the Fifth Amendment regarding federal government action.15 5 Justice O'Connor
summarized three principles that the Supreme Court had established relating to governmental racial classifications: skepticism regarding any racial or ethnic preference; consistency in the
application of the standard of review; and congruence in the equal
protection inquiry.1 56 Taken together, the Justice proffered, these
propositions meant that any person, regardless of race, has a right
to insist that racial classifications by a government actor resulting
in unequal treatment be subject to the strictest judicial review.1 5 7
The majority then considered Metro Broadcasting,Inc. v. Federal
Communications Commission,158 which disavowed the well established
idea that the federal and state governments are to be held to the
same standard regarding equal protection analysis by requiring
that benign racial categorizations by the federal government pass
only intermediate level scrutiny. 159 Justice O'Connor chastised the
153 Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2110 (citing City of Richmond v.JA. Croson, 488 U.S. 469
(1989)). See supra notes 93-108 and accompanying text (recounting Croson).
154

Id.

155 Id. at 2110 (citing Croson, 448 U.S. at 493-94). The Croson Court held that a state
has the power to eliminate the consequences of discrimination within its domain, as
long as there is "a 'strong basis in evidence for its conclusion that remedial action was
necessary.' Id. (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267, 277
(1986)). The Croson majority also insisted that the program be narrowly tailored to
remedy the impact of past discrimination. Id. (citing 488 U.S. at 508).
156 Id. at 2111. The majority explained that courts must be skeptical of any racial or
ethnic preferential treatment; thus, policies incorporating such treatment must receive scrutinizing review. Id. (citing Wygant, 476 U.S. at 273). The Justice stated that
the standard of review must be consistent; therefore, review under the Equal Protection Clause is not contingent upon the race of those individuals that benefit or are
burdened by a classification. Id. (citing Croson, 488 U.S. at 494). The Court asserted
that equal protection evaluation under the Fifth Amendment is congruent to that
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93
(1975)).
157 Id. at 2111.
158 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
159 Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2111-12. The Metro BroadcastingCourt declared that all
benign federal racial categorizations, even if designed to remedy past discrimination,
"'are constitutionally permissible to the extent that they serve importantgovernmental
objectives within the power of Congress and are substantially related to achievement of
those objectives."' Id. at 2112 (quoting Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S.
547, 564-65 (1990)).
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Metro BroadcastingCourt's decision because it ignored the importance of strictly scrutinizing all governmental racial classifications
and parted from precedents requiring the same standards for federal and state racial categorizations. 16 The Court emphasized that
the Metro Broadcastingopinion disregarded the fact that the Fifth
16 1
and Fourteenth Amendments safeguard persons, not groups.
Thus, the majority explained, all racially-motivated acts of government are almost always prohibited and must be subjected to strict
scrutiny.1 62 The Justice declared that all racial categorizations,
whether imposed by federal, state, or local government, must be
reviewed under strict scrutiny, effectively overruling Metro
3
16

Broadcasting.

The majority next addressed criticisms expressed by the dissent that its decision in Adarand had strayed from the doctrine of
stare decisis. 64 The court acknowledged that "any departure from
the doctrine of stare decisis demands special justification." 65 In defense of its determination, the Court explained that the majority's
opinion in Adarand complied with a long line of previous cases that
had established an accepted principle, and adherence to the erroneous outcome in Metro Broadcastingwould have further upset this
precept. 166
160 Id. at 2112. Justice O'Connor explained that all governmental racial categorizations must be strictly scrutinized to ensure that the classifications are "'benign' or
'remedial"' and "'not illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype."' Id. at 2112 (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 493). Furthermore, the Court resolved that Metro Broadcasting
defied the Supreme Court's established proposition that the standards relevant to
federal and state racial categorizations be comparable. Id. at 2111.
161 Id. at 2112.
162 Id. at 2112-13 (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)).
The majority explicated that "detailed judicial inquiry to ensure that the personalright
to equal protection of the laws has not been infringed" upon is necessary to safeguard
individuals subject to a group classification. Id. at 2113.
163 Id. at 2113. The majority expounded that racial classifications will be deemed
constitutional "only if they are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling
governmental interests." Id.
164 Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2116. Stare decisis means "to abide by, or adhere to,
decided cases." BLACKS LAw DICTIONARY 1406 (6th ed. 1990). According to the stare
decisis doctrine, "when [a] court has once laid down a principle of law as applicable
to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle, and apply it to all future
cases, where facts are substantially the same; regardless of whether the parties and
property are the same." Id. (citing Home v. Moody, 146 S.W.2d 505, 509-10 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1940)).
165 Id. at 2114 (quoting Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984)).
166 Id. at 2115. In justifying its decision, the majority professed that:
[r]emaining true to an "intrinsically sounder" doctrine established in
prior cases better serves the values of stare decisis than would following a
more recently decided case inconsistent with the decisions that came
before it; the latter course would simply compound the recent error
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Finally, the Court affirmed that use of the strict scrutiny stan-

dard of review does not automatically render a terminal result to a
challenged benign racial classification.1" 7 The majority remanded
the case to deliberate its merits in light of the newly pronounced
standard.'6 8 The Court left for the lower court to decide whether

the government's use of compensation
clauses in contracts can en169
dure a heightened level of scrutiny.
Justice Scalia, concurring with the judgment, expressed that a
more rigid version of strict scrutiny analysis should be applied, one
which the challenged policy would not likely pass.' 7 0 The Justice
disagreed with the majority's view that the government's demands
for preferential treatment based on race to compensate for past
discrimination could constitute a compelling interest. 17 1 Justice
Scalia opined that persons who have been victims of racial discrimination should be "made whole," but that the Constitution does not
permit a "creditor or a debtor race."17 2

Justice Thomas, also concurring in the judgment, wrote separately to stress a personal belief that equal protection does not encompass a racial paternalism exception.173 The Constitution,
Justice Thomas maintained, does not condone discrimination,

even if motivated by "a sincere desire to help those thought to be
and would likely make the unjustified break from previously established
doctrine complete. In such a situation, "special justification" exists to
depart from the recently decided case.
Id.
167 Id. at 2117 (citing Fuilove, 448 U.S. at 519) (Marshall, J., concurring) (proclaiming that the strict scrutiny standard of review is "strict in theory, but fatal in
fact"). The majority buttressed this statement by citing United States v. Paradise, 480
U.S. 149, 167 (1986), where a unanimous Court held that the discriminatory behavior
of the Alabama Department of Public Safety warranted race-based relief which was
narrowly tailored. Id. (citing Paradise, 480 U.S. at 167).
168 Id. at 2118. The court of appeals had upheld the challenged governmental actions, applying intermediate scrutiny in light of Metro Broadcastingand Fullilove. Id.
Intermediate level scrutiny requires that the contested statutes and regulations be
"narrowly tailored to achieve [their] significant governmental purpose of providing
subcontracting opportunities for small disadvantaged business enterprises." Id. (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 16 F.3d 1537, 1547 (10th Cir. 1994).
169 Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2118.
170 Id. at 2119 (Scalia, J., concurring).
171 Id. at 2118 (Scalia, J., concurring).
172 Id. Justice Scalia proffered that this concept is not compatible with the Constitution's focus upon the individual. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1). See
supra note 3 (defining the Fourteenth Amendment).
173 Id. at 2119 (Thomas, J, concurring). Justice Thomas postulated that laws contrived to suppress a race and laws devised to allocate benefits to a minority group as a
means of advancing a concept of equality are morally and constitutionally equivalent.
Id. (quoting Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2120) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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disadvantaged."1 7 4 Furthermore, the Justice submitted that such
benign discrimination will unintentionally be detrimental to those
17
it seeks to assist.

5

In a dissenting opinion,joined by Justice Ginsburg, Justice Stevens objected to the majority's view of "consistency," discerning between malignant discrimination and reformatory race-based
preferences. 176 The majority's interest in consistent review of racebased policies, the dissent lamented, does not warrant handling
different types of disparate treatment among persons as if they
were analogous. 1 77 The Justice further disagreed with the Court's
application of strict scrutiny to benign race-based policies because
its language connotates the "spell of death" when applied to even
well-crafted benign programs. 7 8 Justice Stevens further questioned the logic in the majority's consistency approach by reasoning that as the law stands now, gender-based affirmative action
programs will be more easily enacted than race-based affirmative
Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2119 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. Justice Thomas explained that "benign" discrimination perpetuates the belief that minorities cannot compete with nonminorities because of "chronic and apparently immutable handicaps." Id. The Justice explained that such programs will
inevitably generate convictions of supremacy or inflame indignation among individuals who think that they have been persecuted by governmental race based preferences. Id. Moreover, Justice Thomas suggested that affirmative action policies "stamp
minorities with a badge of inferiority and may cause them to develop dependencies or
to adopt an attitude that they are 'entitled' to preferences." Id.
176 Id. at 2120 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Regarding the majority's opinion that there
is no meaningful difference between imposing hardship on minority race members
and giving certain members of a minority an advantage despite an unintended burden on some majority group members, Justice Stevens proffered that:
[t] here is no moral or constitutional equivalence between a policy that
is designed to perpetuate a caste system and one that seeks to eradicate
racial subordination. Invidious discrimination is an engine of oppression, subjugating a disfavored group to enhance or maintain the power
of the majority. Remedial race-based preferences reflect the opposite
impulse: a desire to foster equality in society.
Id.
177 Id. at 2121 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens illustrated this position:
The consistency that the Court espouses would disregard the difference
between a "No Trespassing" sign and a welcome mat. It would treat a
Dixiecrat Senator's decision to vote against Thurgood Marshall's confirmation in order to keep African Americans off the Supreme Court as on
a par with President Johnson's evaluation of his nominee's race as a
positive factor. It would equate a law that made black citizens ineligible
for military service with a program aimed at recruiting black soldiers.
An attempt by the majority to exclude members of a majority race from
a regulated market is fundamentally different from a subsidy that enables a relatively small group of newcomers to enter that market.
Id.
178 Id. at 2120-21 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
174
175
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action policies, despite the fact that the Equal Protection Clause
was enacted to terminate discrimination against slaves. 179
The dissent proceeded by discrediting the assertion that affirmative action programs do more harm than good to its intended
beneficiaries.'
First, the Justice asserted that only the beneficiaries of a specific program have standing to argue that point, and
their failure to do so signals that they do not find it detrimental to
their cause.'" Second, Justice Stevens contended that the legislature will evaluate the success of affirmative action programs and if
the approach proves harmful to the minority it is targeted to help,
it will remedy the problem.' 82
Justice Stevens next chided the majority's congruence concept, maintaining that significant differences exist between federal
and state decision-making responsibilities. 3 First, the dissent emphasized that Congress's role as a coequal branch under the Constitution, empowered to ensure the "general welfare of the United
States" and execute the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection
guarantees, enabled the Supreme Court to grant deference to the
legislature. 184 Additionally, the Justice advanced that it is logical to
179 Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2122 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent revealed that
the Supreme Court requires application of intermediate scrutiny to harmful gender
discrimination cases and strict scrutiny to harmful race discrimination cases; however,
the Court applies strict scrutiny to both benign and harmful race classifications. Id.
180 Id. at 2123 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
181 Id. at 2122-23 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In the case at bar, the Justice advanced, none of the beneficiaries of the challenged program have contested its constitutionality, perhaps because they do not find the preferences detrimental, or possibly
because they are not compelled to participate in the program. Id.
182 Id. at 2123 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens disclosed that a legislature enacts an affirmative action program to eliminate barriers that have prejudiced
persons with parallel qualifications. Id. The Justice proposed that, unlike governmental action based on malevolent discrimination, if such programs do not obtain
this goal, the legislature will correct the problem. Id.
183 Id. at 2123 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
184 Adarand, 115 S.Ct. at 2124 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Fullilove v. Klutznick,
448 U.S. 448, 472 (1980)). The dissent bolstered its position by notingJustice Scalia's
opinion in Richmond v. J A. Croson Co., remarking
it is one thing to permit racially based conduct by the Federal Government-whose legislative powers concerning matters of race were explicitly enhanced by the Fourteenth Amendment, see U.S. CONST. amend.
14, § 5-and quite another to permit it by the precise entities against
whose conduct in matters of race that Amendment was specifically directed, see U.S. CONST. amend. 14, § 1.
Id. (quoting Richmond v.J. A. Croson Co., 448 U.S. 469, 521-22 (1989)). The dissent
buttressed its view that greater deference must be given to the National Legislature
than to local governing bodies by explaining that federal policies that use racial preferences portray the conviction of the whole country's elected delegates. Id. at 2125
(Stevens, J., dissenting). The Justice expounded that, in the local context, persons
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afford Congress greater deference than a state legislature because
Congress is composed of the whole country's elected representatives, whereas the state legislature is devised of local elected officials whose decrees may affect nonresidents who had no input on
the decision to pass the legislation.' 85 Finally, Justice Stevens heralded, the language of section five of the Fourteenth Amendment
directly grants Congress the power to protect racial minorities
against any state's attempt to deprive them of their constitutionally
protected rights. 86
Justice Stevens continued by criticizing the Court's disregard
of stare decisis.'8 7 The Justice disagreed with the majority's proposition that in overruling Metro Broadcastingit was merely reinstating
the status quo ante, insisting that precedent had been well established.1 88 The dissent then stressed that the majority's ruling in
Adarand applied only to the level of scrutiny to be used in determining the constitutionality of an affirmative action program, and
not whether advancing diversity may sustain an adequate interest
to absolve such a program.18 9
In conclusion, Justice Stevens trumpeted that Fullilove should
be controlling in this case. 9 0 TheJustice pointed out that because
the program at issue in Fullilove was deemed constitutional, then
surely the scheme debated in Adarand should also pass constitutional muster. 9 ' The dissent compared several aspects of the two
programs and deduced that the Act challenged in Adarand was
more narrowly tailored than the federal program upheld in Fullilove and, thus, should survive strict scrutiny.19
unable to vote for the legislator who enacts an affirmative action policy may unjustly
feel the effects of that program. Id.
185 Id.
186 Id. at 2126. Section five of the Fourteenth Amendment states that "Congress
shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST. amend. 14, § 5.
187 Id. at 2126. See note 163 (explaining the doctrine of stare decisis).
188 Id. at 2127 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent revealed that although the majority perceived Metro Broadcasting and Croson as inharmonious, it distinguished the
cases because one involved a federal program, and the other involved a city regulation. Id.
189 Adarand 115 S.Ct. at 2127-28 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
190 Id. at 2128 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
191 Id. at 2128 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The program contested in Fullilove was the
Public Works Employment Act of 1977. Id. See supra notes 70-77 and accompanying
text (requiring a ten percent set-aside of federal resources for local public works
projects to go to minority businesses). The Acts opposed in Adarand were the Small
Business Act and the Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act
of 1987. Id.
192 Id. at 2128-30. The dissent explained that to determine whether a person quali-
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Justice Souter, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, authored a dissenting opinion that questioned the need in the case at
bar to inquire into the appropriate standard of review utilized in
evaluating statutes. 1 93 TheJustice maintained that the standard set
forth in Fullilovewas controlling, and that under this standard, the
statutory scheme in Adarand is constitutional. 9 4 The dissent then
emphasized that the Court's opinion did not alter Congress's
power pursuant to the Fifth Amendment, to employ programs
geared to rectifying the effects of prior invidious discrimination in
certain situations.1 95
In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Ginsburg, joined by
Justice Breyer, averred that the Court has overstepped its bounds
because Congress is qualified and authorized by the Constitution
to take action to remedy racial subjugation. 96 Justice Ginsburg
proceeded by focusing on the significant consensus among the
members of the Court that racial inequality persists and Congress
has the power to take steps to counteract delayed consequences of
discrimination.19 7 The Justice then discussed the majority's adoption of strict scrutiny review for all racial classifications by the government, recognizing that the strict standard must be terminal
fies to participate in the SBA and STURAA, race is not the sole factor, unlike the 1977
Act in which a business may be eligible to benefit from the programs if it proves social
and economical hardship. Id. at 2128. Justice Stevens found more significant, however, the fact that the race-based presumption in the challenged policy could be rebutted if economic or social disadvantages did not exist. Id. at 2129 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). The Justice then demonstrated that in the 1987 programs, no numerical
requirements are set, which differs from the 1977 Act requiring a ten percent setaside. Id. at 2130 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Finally, Justice Stevens asserted that there
was extensive deliberation by Congress preceding enactment of the 1987 Acts, as opposed to meager debate before the 1977 Act was passed. Id.
193 Id. at 2131 (Souter,J., dissenting). Justice Souter maintained that the statutory
scheme was justified previously as providing remedies for the remaining effects of
prior discrimination. Id. (citing Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 448). The Justice also contended that because Adarand did not allege any particularized findings adequate to
render the Fullilove holding obsolete, it must be followed. Id.
194 Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2132 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter agreed with
Justice Steven's deduction that the doctrine of stare decisis demands the employment
of Fullilove. Id.
195 Id.
196 Id. at 2134 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (agreeing with Justice Stevens that the judiciary owes Congress great deference in its decision to legislate in order to remedy the
effects of past discrimination).
197 Id. at 2134 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg mentioned the United
States' history of treating the white race as dominant. Id. It was not until Loving v.
Virginia, the Justice noted, that the Court ruled against a law "'designed to maintain
White Supremacy.'" Id. at 2135 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (striking a Virginia law that prohibited interracial marriages as
unconstitutional)).
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when applied to invidious discrimination, but more lenient when
applied to benign classifications.19 ' Justice Ginsburg concluded by
predicting that the Court's decision is not conclusive, but a step in
a still-evolving precedent. 199
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court moved in the right direction by requiring
strict scrutiny review of all racial classifications. Although minorities have been subjected to discrimination, policies that blatantly
favor one group over another will not serve to remedy disparate
treatment and prejudice. Such policies inadvertently promote discrimination by fostering resentment among its nonminority victims... and harboring invidious
stereotypes that conjure false
20 1
perceptions of inferiority.
Policies that utilize preferential treatment to advance a particular minority group may legitimately redress prejudicial treatment
for those worthy individuals who were victims of past discrimination by the organization implementing the affirmative action program. The "inadvertent discrimination" that results from less
exacting schemes, however, harms all minorities and strains race
relations. In short, because affirmative action policies can have onerous side-effects, it is crucial that such policies be implemented
only when they are the sole feasible alternative to remedying specific, proven discrimination. Thus, policies based on racial preferences must be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny.
The only acceptable purpose of an affirmative action program
is to remedy specific instances of prior discrimination. Promoting
diversity is not an objective that justifies sacrificing a person's constitutionally-protected individual rights, and should never be a permitted purpose of preferential treatment policies. In addition,
198 Id. at 2136 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg commended the decision for restating that the use of strict scrutiny review enables unacceptable applications of racially motivated governmental policies to be distinguished from legitimate
uses. Id.
199 Adarand,115 S. Ct. at 2136 (Ginsburg,J., dissenting). TheJustice stated that the
program at issue should not be disturbed, but instead left to the legislature for improvement. Id.
200 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2119 (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
201 See supra notes 49 (explaining how affirmative action programs may intimate
inferiority). Stephen Carter explained that the detrimental racial stereotype that
black persons cannot compete with white persons is reinforced, for example, when
employers are encouraged to ignore qualifications and use race-based preferential
treatment in hiring decisions. CARTER, supra note 49, at 50.
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diversity as a goal amplifies the differences between persons, and
stereotypes these minority groups. The ultimate ambition of affirmative action programs is equality, and it is anomalous to stress
the dissimilarities between people as a means of achieving that objective. Individuals should be evaluated by their own personal
characteristics and life experiences, and employers or admissions
committees should not be required to assume that skin color or
national origin, in and of itself, provides an applicant with a more
diverse background.
The federal and state governments should assist economicallyor socially-disadvantaged individuals by offering benefits that will
enable them to help themselves. For example, the public sector
should provide increased public expenditures or monetary incentives to encourage private individuals to revitalize poverty stricken
areas and furnish job skills training. In the employment and university admissions context, favorably considering the hardships
confronted by an individual, for instance, should be encouraged by
federal, state, and local governments. Such benefits should be
given, however, on the basis of need and merit, and in a race-neutral manner to ensure that only truly disadvantaged and deserving
persons are helped, and that "inadvertent discrimination" is not
perpetuated.
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